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This paper reexamines the market structun: problem in the strategic trade policy littrature.
It is shown that home management-labor cooperation in the form of rent-sharing raises total
home industry rents regardless of whether the intemational duopoly is Coumot or Bertrand.
Furthermore, home welfaze also rises with fum-union rcnt-sharing if the international industry
consists of more than two firms, if the industry is faced with entry, and if there is domestic
consumption. 71iis paper shows that management-labor cooperation can be a robust strategic
industrial policy and can be interpreted as a solution to the market swcture dilemma.1. introduction
The study of trade policies to enhance a country's competitiveness in an oligopolistic
environment has attracted increasing attention in recent years (e.g., see Helptnan and Krugman
1989). Brander and Spencer's (1984, 1985) pioneering work show that tariffs and export
subsidies serve as policies that increase the home country's economic rents at the expense of the
foreign country. Eaton and Grossman (1986) and Cheng (1987) highlight the fact that the nature
of the optimal industrial policy will depend critically on the nature of the oligopolistic
interaction. Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) analyu the results in the oligopolistic
trade policy literature by the concepts of strategic substitutes and completnents. Dixit (1984)
further shows that the Brander-Spencer result will depend on the number of firms in the mazket,
while Venables (1985) and Horstman and Mazkusen (1986) emphasiu the fact that entry
conditions will modify considerably the basic profit-shifting azguments. All these important
qualifications in the strategic trade policy literature seem to point to a professional consensus
that the govemment, at least at thi~ stage of our knowledge about various industry conditions,
simply dces not have enough information to cany out a successful industrial policy.
However, though the literature has undetstandably focused on the instruments of taxes and
subsidies, there are other less discussed elements that are included in the industrial policy
proposals. One often repeated idea is the concept of enhanced collaboration between
management and labor. The origin of this notion is partly based on the observation that in Japan,
the unions seem to be more willing to act and adapt to increase the company's profits, while in
North America, the traditional labor-management relationship tends to be adversatial. One
proposal that may serve to moderate the antagonistic relationship is to institute a rent-sharing
plan between the workers and the owners of the firm. [t has been pointed out that the Japanese
bonus system has the essential properties of profit-sharing (Freeman and Weitzman 1987). On a
macroeconomic level, rent-sharing has also been advocated as a beneficial labor market-2-
institution that can lead to lower unemployment and lower inflation (Weitzman 1984, 1985). [n
this paper, we exclusively concentnte on the question of whether management-labor
cooperation can serve as a strategic industrial policy, i.e., whether the indusrry renrs can be
increased.l In the next section, we set up the basic duopoly framework, where it is seen that
sharing rents will increase the total industry rents (the sum of the rents of the union and the fitm)
regardless of whether the international duopolists are Cournot-Nash or Bertand-Nash. In section
3, our results are seen to apply also to the case of an international oligopoly with m foreign fitms
and n domestic firms. In section 4, it is shown that rent-sharing can still increase total industry
profits when the international oligopoly is faced with endogenous entry. Thus the rent-
enhancing properry of this kind of management-labor cooperation is shown to be robust with
respect to the type of oligopolistic interactions, the number of oligopolises, and entry and can be
viewed as a possible "solution" to the market structure dilemma in the strategic industrial policy
literature. In section 5, we examine the conditions under which sharing rents is still beneficial
when domestic consumption constitutes part of the country's welfare. Finally, some concluding
remarks will be provided in the last section.
2. Basic Duopoly Model
The basic product market model is standard in the literature. We consider two intemational
firms, one domestic and one foreign. The domestic fvm produces good x and the foreign firm
produces good ~~ , a substitute. As in Eaton and Grossman (1986), we assume initially that both
firms export to a third market in order to focus on the rent-enhancing effects of an industrial
Fxilicy. For the home country, we consider a situation wherc a rent sharing plan is set up so that
a fraction 9 of the firm's rents are distributed to the workers. We first examine the Cournot-Nash
case. The firms will maximize their respective profit functions tt and tt':
n-(1 -8)1t-(1 -9)IXP(x,y)-c(x,w,rt,..., r~)) (1)-3-
n~ -)P~(x,Y)-c'(Y, w'.r~ , . , rc') (2)
where p and p' are the domestic and foreign inverse demands in the third market and c and c'
are the home and foreign cost functions. For x and y to be substitutes, we assume
px - ap lax c 0, py - dp~ay ~ 0, p~ - ap'~ax c 0 and p~ - ap'lay c 0. w and w' are the wages
of labor in each country. r; (i - 1, ..., r) and r;' (i - 1, ..., r) are the prices of the i-th
nonlabor inputs that are necessary for the production of good x and good y, respectively. It is
assumed that each firm produces its output with a different production funetion f and f', with
r t 1 inputs. Both f and f' are continuous from above, quasiconcave and are nondecreasing.
The dual cost functions c and c' are twice continuously differentiable with respect to the outputs
and the input prices. All input prices except the home wage are competitively determined. For
w, it is assumed to be set by a domestic labor union. This set up is cssentially similar to that in
Brander and Spencer (1986),~ whose model also features intemational duopolists with a]abor
union. With a given domestic wage rate, the Cournot-Nash firms maximize their profits:
nx -(1 -e)[P tP: -~:1-0 (3)
ny -P~ t)'Py -cy -~ (4)
rtu ~ 0 nyy c 0 (5 )
H- rtu rzyy - nxy nyz ~ 0 (6)
where subscripts are partials. (3) and (4) are the first order necessary conditions, (5) represents
the sufficient second order conditions and (6) is the usual stability condition for the Cournot
fit~rts. To facilitate the presentation and to relate our results to the literature, we shall somctimes
invoke the following:
1[~, c 0 1t~, c 0
(7) assumes that the normal Coumot-Nash reaction functions are downward sloping in the-4-
quantity space. This assumption, however, is ror necessary for the results in this paper until
section 5, where domestic consumption is taken into account.
Totally differentiate the first order conditions rz; (x , y, w) and rzy(x , y) from (3) and (4)
and using the implicit function theorem, we obtain
(dzldw )` - -[c~,,.ltyylH (8)
(dy Idw )` - s~,,, rzyx1H (9)
where the subscript c is used to represent the Ctxirnot case, n~,,, --(1 - e)cn„ --(1 - 9)cWx -
-(1 -9)(a!!ax), by the Shepherd's lemma. Assuming that labor is a normal input, we have
al~ax ~ 0, rzj,,, ~ 0, and thus (dxldw)` ~ 0. Furthertnore if the foreign reaction function is
"normal," wc have rzyx ~ 0 and (~lv ~dw )` ~ 0. The slope of the home derived demand for labor
I(x(w),w)is
(d[ Idw )` -(a! lax )(dx Idw )` t a! law (10)
where allaw ~ 0 is the derivative )jroperty of th cost function and (dsldw)` is from (8). We
next turn to the labor union, which is assumed to óave a well-defined objective function U:
U -(w -k)! t91t (11)
k ts the altemative wage that the workers can obtain elsewhere. ( 11) assumes that the union will
act to maximize its economic rents. There are considerable disagreements as to what the union's
objective functions are.3 The reason we prefer this formulation here is that we can sum up the
change to U and rz to get a measure of the change to total industry rents due to an industrial
policy. Purthcrmore, this ~bjective functinn also allows us t~ interpret the union as any
upstream input supplier so that uur conclusions become more general. The term 9rz in (11)
reflects the portion of the uniun's rents due to rent-sharing. 'I'his type of labor-management
practice is tieen to be fairly widespread in Japan, where a worker is paid a fixed salary plus
biannual bonuses which can amuunt to one-third of the worker's annual income (Allen 1981,-5-
Aoki 1988).
Overall, our model can be interpreted as a two-stage game with subgame perfect property.
In the first stage, the home union moves fust to set the wage, taking the derived demand
(dl ~dw )` in (10) and the tetm 8a into account when calculating its optimal w. In the second
stage, the firms take this input price as given and the intetnational duopolis[s set simultaneously
and independently their strategic variables (in this particular case, quantity). Maximization of U
by the labor union yields the first and second order conditions
(Uw )` - (dUIdw )` -1 f (w - k )(dl ldw )` f 8(dttldw )` - 0 (12)
(U,,,,,, )` - (dZUldwz)` ~ 0 (13)
Totally differentiate (12) with respect to A and w and solve:
(dw Id6)` - -(U,,,e)` ~(U,,,,., )` - -(d1[Idw )` l(U....,, )` (14)
Using (1) and the Shepherd's lemma, (d n~dw )` - zpy (dy ldw )` - l. If the Cournot reaction
function is normal, we have (dy.idw)` ~ 0 by (9) and with Py ~ 0, we have (dTtldw)` ~ 0 and
thus (dw Id 9)` ~ 0. Note that (14) holds for the particular value of A- 0 so that (dwId 9)` can
be intetpreted to mean that instituting rent-sharing for the normal Coutnot case will reduce the
wage quoted by the home union to the home firm. From the results of Eaton and Grossman
(1986), we can infer that the result of (dw~d6)` ~ 0 is only true for the "normal" Cournot-Nash
firms and will not generally hold for the Bertrand-Nash fums, as will be confirmed later.
What is the impact of rent-sharing on total home export rents? Define NW - tt t U as
home national welfare. NW can be rewtitten as n t U where U-(w -k )l. Differentiate NW
with respect to 6 and using the union's first order condition, we obtain
(dN44'Id6)` -( 1 -6)(dtUdw)`(dwld6)` (15)
Substitute (14) into (15)-6-
(dNW ~d 6)` - -(1 - 9)[(d1Udw )` ]ZI(U,,,~„ )` ? 0 (16)
i.e., except for the case where (d rz~dw )` is ezactly zero, the sum of the home firm's rents and the
home labor union's rents rises with the setting up of a plan of sharing rents.4 To see clearly the
international renr shifring nature of domestic management-labor cooperation, we can examine
the impact of 9 on foreign profits and obtain
(d n'~d6)` ~ 0
Thus, like any traditional strategic trade policy, domestic rent-sharing in the Coumot-Nash
case will raise home welfare and reduce forcign profits.
From the expression of (16), it can be seen that (drz~dw)` can actually take either positive
or negative sign and (dlvryV ~d 0)` ~ 0 will still hold. This means that even if we have a
nonstandard upward-slopíng foreign Cournot-Nash reaction function with tty~ ~ 0 and
(r1.~ ~dw )` ~ 0(see (9)) so that (dNdw )` - xpy (dv ~dw )` - l ~ 0, we shall still have the result
that (dIV6V Id 8)` ~ 0. When we treat the case of the "nomtal" Bertrand-Nash firms, we shall
indeed encounter the situation where dnldw has an ambiguous sign. However, as we just
argued above, this will not change the conclusion that sharing rents will raise national welfare.
So now we shall formally analyze the Bertrand-Nash case. The direct demands x(~,, p')
and ~~ (p , p') can be obtained by inverting the inverse demands p(x , y) and p~(x , y) postulated
earlier. For x and y to be substitutes, we have x t- axlap ~ 0, x, - ax ~ap' ~ 0, y t - ay ~ap ~ 0,
and y ~-~i~ ir~p' ~ 0. The relevant profit functions with a home rent-sharing plan are:
n-(1 -e)rt-(1 -e)IPx(n,P~)-c(x(p.p~),w,rt,..., r~))
n~-P~)'(r.p')-c~O'(p,P~),w~.r~. . , r~~)
Given wage rate w, the Bertrand-Nash firtns will maximize their respective profits:
(17)
(18)
rz~ -l1 -E311~ tPxi - ~,xtl -~ (I91-~-
rz~.-y }n'yi-~y'y~-o
rzpp ~ 0 aP-o. ~ 0




(19) and (20) are the necessary first order conditions, while (21) is the set of sufficient second
order conditions. (22) is the standard stability condition for price-setting firms. As in the
Cournot case, in order to relate some of oar results to those in the literature we shall sometimes
make references to the case of "normal" Bertrand reaction functions, i.e., assuming rtyP. ~ 0,
rzP-P ~ 0, even though these assumptioos are nor necessary for our conclusions. Totally
differentiate rzP (p , p', w) and ttp.(p , p') from (19) and (20) with respect to p, p" and w and
solve
(dp~dw )B - -7tpw, Pp.PIJ - (1 - 8)z t(tillax )1tP.p.lJ (23)
(dp'!dw )e - ttp,,,1t;.PIJ - -(1 - A}~ t(allax )rzp.p~J (24)
where the superscript B is used to denote the Bertrand case. Using (23) and (24), we have
(dx Idw )B - x t(dp Idw )B t x Z(dp'Idw )B (25)
(dy Idw )B - y ~(dp ~dw )B t y 2(dp'Idw )B (26)
The slope of the home derived demand for labor ((x (w ), w) is
(dl~dw~-(al ~az )(dx~dw )B f al law
As for the union, the equations are formally the same as those in the Coumot case:
U -(w -k)l f9rz
(Uw )Q - 1 t(k' - k)(d! ~~lw )8 t 6(drzldw )B - 0
(U,,.w )Q ~ 0
(Z~)-8-
The only difference here is that now the union takes (dlldw )B and (drzldw )B rather than
(dl !dw )` and (d nldw )` into account when setting the optimizing wage. Differentiate the
union's first order condition with respect the 9 and w, we again obtain:
(dwId 9)B - ~d tddw )B I(U,,,,,, )B (28)
Unlike the case of "normal" Cournot reaction functions where dnldw ~ 0, the sign of diddw
with "normal" Bertrand reaction functions is ambiguous. From (17),
(d rtldw )B - xZ(dp'Idw )B (p - cj ) -1 ~ 0 (29)
where xZ ~ 0, (p - cx )~ 0 and (dp'Idw )B ~ 0 if the foreign firm's reaction function is upward
sloping in the p' - p space. From (29), we can see that in the Bertrand case, a rise in the home
waóc has twu cffccts un the home tirm's prufits. It raises thc total costs of production, as
represented by the term (i3c!dw )-1. But a rise in w also makes the equilibrium more collusive,
enhancing rc (Dixit 1986). In the event that there are no direct factor cost changes so that the
term ! is absent, then only the collusive effect remains and (dtrJdw )B ~ 0, as in the case
discussed by Eaton and Grossman (1986), who deduced that for Bertrand-Nash producers, a tax
will raise home welfare.
Though we cannot sign (d ttldw )B and so the sign of (dtiv!d 0)B is indetetminate, we can
still analyze the effects of rent-sharing on total home economic profits, in light of the discussion
associated with (16). Define again NW - rt t U, which can be written as NW - tt t U, where
L~ -(w - k)1. Differentiate NW with respect to 9 and using the union's first order condition:
(dNW Id 9)B - -(1 - A)[(d rzldw )B 1~!(U,,...- )B ? ~ (3~)
Except for the somewhat unlikely case where (d rzld,v )B is exactly zero, rent-sharing will still
raise national welfare with price-setting firms. If (d rz!dw )B - 0, we have (dNW Id 6)p - 0. ln
other words, at worst rent-sharin~ will leave national welfare unchanged. Assumin; that
~! n ~h, s 0. we can ~ummarize our results:-9-
Proposirion 1: Rent-sharing benveen rhe home union and rhe home firm wi!! increase rotal
home economic renrs regardless of wherher the inrernarional duopolisrs are Cournor-Nash or
Berrrand-Nash.
Formally, the expression of dNW ~d 9 is the samc for both the quantity-setting firms and the
pricc-sctting firms (compare (16) to (30)), with both involving thc square of the tcrm daldw and
the union's second order condition U,,,,,. It is also wotth repcating that our results do not depend
on the signs of the slopes of the reaction functions. As a rent-enhancing policy, why is rent
sharing not sensitive to the nature of the duopolistic interaction in its impact on national welfare,
as is the cau in Eaton and Grossman (1986)? Somewhat mechanically, the result can he seen to
come about because when the union maximizes its objection funetion, it takes the derived labor
demand and the sensitiviry of profits to a change in wage into account. The derived dcmand and
thc profit sensitivity summariu the information of various product market conditions so that
whcn the rent-sharing union mazimius its objective, it will implicitly tnaximiu total industry
rents for all rypes of oligopolistic interactions. Notc that our rcsults do not come about because
we treat the labor union in an unusual manner. Our modeling of the union here is simply a
straightforward extension of the standard textbook treatment.s
On a conceptual level, the shazed parameter A can be interpreted as a measure of the dzgree
of cooperation between the union and the firm and sharing rents is thus analogous to creating a
partial collusion between the workers and the capital owners. As is usual with the formation of a
canel, the result of the increase of the total "monopoly" rents will hold no matter whether we
have a price-setting or quantity-setting industry. More concretely, note that generally the
participants in a typical cartel will have an inccntive to share any relevant information needed to
maximize total joint profits. So in the event that the union does not have sufficient information
about the product market conditions (whether the competition is price-setting or quantiry
setting), the firm will have an incentive to let the union knowó so that the labor union can raise-10-
or lower its optimal wage to tax or to subsidiu the producer to incrcase the pool of company
profits, which the workers will eventually sharc. 71te carul property explains why the rent-
enhancing effect of rent-sharing is not industry-sperific.
Finally, if we interpret our modcl as a two-stage game, then our conclusions can be further
understood by noting that the major problem of implementing the "correct" industrial policy
under oligopoly is that the government is an exogenous first mover~ and thus it dces not have the
knowledge of whether the international firms are quantity-setting or price-setting. This problem
will be "solved" if the agent that is conducting the policy is endogenous to the market. A natural
candidatc to fulfill that role is an input supplier in the factor markets. In our particular case, the
supplier is the labor union. Rent-sharing creates an incentive for the union to change its optimal
wage to subsidiu or to tax the firm correctly to incrcase tota] to-be-shan:d profits, and by the
rational expectation properry of the subgame perfect equilibrium, the union will incorporate all
second-stage information that will affect its own payoff when maximizing its rents.
Overall, management-labor cooperation in the form of sharing rents shifu the responsibiliry
of carrying out effective traditional industrial policies (subsidiration or taxation) from the
exogenous government to an endogenous market participant who is in a"joint venturc" with the
firm, sidestepping the difficulry of requiring the govemment to gather detailed knowledgc about
the indusuy. In this way, rent-sharing can be viewed as a"solution" to the market structure
dilemma widely discussed in the strategic industria] policy literaturz.
3. n Domestic Firms and m Foreign Firms
In this section we shall extend our analysis to the case of an oligopolistic industry with n
identical domestic firms and m identical foreign firms. As before, each domestic fum produces
good z, while each foreign firm produces a substitute, good y. We first consider the Coutnot-
Nash case. The method of analysis is the same as in section 2: wc first derive an expression for-11-
the demand for tabor, which the union will take into account when setting its wage. From the
union's first order condition, we obtain the impact of rent-sharing on the wage rate and thus on
industry rents. As can be seen from the previous section, it is not necessary to sign the tertns
dr~dw , dl ~dw , dtrJdw dcrived in the intetmediate steps in order to show that dNW ~dA is
nonnegative. The relevant profit functions tt' and a~~ for fum i for each country can be written:
n~-(1-A)x;Pi](xt,.. ,x;... .x,,,Yl,.. ,Y~)-c(x;,w,rt,.. ~rr)) (31)
.r ~ ~ ~
rz -Y~P; (xt. . , x,,.Y,... ,Y~,.. ,Y.n)-c'~Yt.w ,r, ,
where all symbols are as previously defined. Profit maximization implies:
d rz'~dx, -(1 - 9)~p; t x,í3p,~dx, - cl ]- 0
dr['~~dY; -Pi~}Y;aP;~lay; -c~, -0
. , r,') (32)
(33)
(34)
Totally differentiate thc first order conditions with respect to x;, y; and w, impose symmetry
xr - x~ . Y; - Y~ .~; -~) . dY; - dY~ and sotve8:
(rz~ z t ín - 1)1tj~j,~i t(m~~y~~~ ' -rzj wdw (35)
("rzr,j,)~~ } (rzr,r, t (m - 1)rzr,r,WYi -0






where the superscript c again refers to the Cournot case, t[; w --(1 - 9)al,~ax,, and for stability,
A - (n; , . (n - 1)n; , ) (t[yy . (m - 1)a~'y ) - (m rz; r ) (n rzy; ) x 0. The slope of each home
firm's derived demand for labor is:
(dl; Idw)` -(af; lax; )(dz; Idw )` f al;~aw
Next we can tum to the rent-maximizing union:
(39).12-
U -(w -kMl; t9ntt' (40)
The objective function is similar to that previously used except now thene are n home firms, with
each firm sharing a portion of its profits with the union. Solving the union's maximizing
problem,
(Uw )` - nl; t (w - k )n (d!; Idw )` t 8n (ds' Idw )` - 0 (41)
(U~.,.. )` ~ 0 (42)
Totally differentiating (41) with respect to w and 6, we can again obtain the impact of rent-
sharing on the wagc:
(dw~d9)` --(Uwe)`1(U,,,,,,)` --n(dx'!dw)`~(U,.~,..)` (43)
What is the impact of sharing rents on national welfare? Again define NW - n n t U -
nn' t U, wherc U -(w - k)nl; . Differentiate NW with respect to 9 and usc (41), we have
(dNW Id 6)` --(1 - A)[(dn x' )!dw )` 121(U,,,,,, )` 2 0 (44)
where (d (nn` )Idw )` - n (d n' Idw )` - n (zi [(n - 1)(av;lax, )(dxi !dw )` t m (aP,1aY, )(dY; ~dw )` ]
- l;J~ 0 can be obtaincd from (3l ). since (44) involvcs the square of (d (n n' )Idw )` and
(U,,,,,,)` ~ 0, we see again that exccpt for the case where (da'ldx.)` is exactly zero, we have
(dNW ~d9)` ~ 0, i.e., sharing rents will increase nalional welfare in a n-home-form, m-foreign-
firm intemational Coumot industry.
The method of analysis in the Bertrand case is similar to the Cournot case. We firat derive
the labor demand from the producers' optimization conditions. We next obtain the impact of
rent-sharing on the wagc rate and finally that on the export profits. To save space, we shall leave
the derivations to the interested readers9 and simply state our results:
(dwldA)B --n(drt'~dw)BI(U,,,,,,)B (45)
(dNWld 9)B - ~1 - A)I(d(n n' )Idw )g J21(U,,,,,, )B 2 0 (46)-13-
The ezprcssions of rflVW Id9 under the Coumot and Bervand cases are formally the same
(comparc (44) to (46)) and in general dNW Id9 ~ 0. As in the duopoly case, rent-sharing will
raisc national welfare with cithcr the Cournot or Bertrand firms. Thc intuition for the multifirm
oligopoly situation is idcntical to that for thc duopoly. The industry union undcr an industry-
wide rent-sharing scheme will have an incentive to raise the producer's profiu (as well as its
own original rents). To achievc that, the union will cither raise the wage to taz the firms or
lower the wage to subsidiu the oligopolists, depending on the particulaz mazket condition. As
beforc, the domestic firms are in esunce in cooperation with the union and if nocessary, will
have an incentive to supply the rclevant product market information to the labor union in order
to achieve joint profit maximization. Thus, the Eatv~t-Gross~~san type market structure problem
dces not arise here.l~ Alternatively, the union, unlike the govemment, can be viewed as an
endogenous first mover in a standarà two-stage subgame perfect game, and will then take the
relevant conditions for the second stage into account when mazimizing its rent. Summarizing
our results and assuming da'Idw x 0,
Proposirion 2: For rhe n -home-firm, m foreign-firm inrernational aligopoly, rent-sharing
betwcen the homc union and the home firms will increase tota! homc ecnnomic rents regardless
ojw'hethcr the intcrnutiona! firrns areCournor-Nash or Berrrand-11'ash.
4. Endogenous Entry and Exit
In this section we shall analyze the impact of sharing rents when the domestic and foreign
firms can each endogenously enter their respective home and foreign parts of the industry. We
set the long run equilibrium conditions as n-M and a~~ -M~, where M and M~ are
nonnegative constants. If we wish to allow intetnational capital mobility so that the domestic
firms and the foreign firms eatn the same amount of profits in the long run, we can set ti - a'~ --14-
M and the following analysis will be qualitativcly similu. Tlx existing literatun: (e.g.,
Venables 1985, Horstman and Markusen 1986) utiliu the traditional long run equilibrium
condition of R` - n'- 0, which is most appropriate in the case when: the number of oligopolists
in each country is luge so a potential entrant accurauly anticipates that its entry will only lower
profits per firm by a negligible amount. This pen~t~ts continuous entry with the uro proót
outcome being a good approximation to the actual condition. But if the number of firms is
relatively small, the long run equilibrium profits can rcmain positive due to strategic interactions
between the incumbants and the entrants. A potential entrant may reasonably expect that its
entry will significantly lowcr per firm pro5ts and may then decide to stay out The comments
here parallel those made by Eaton and Grossman (1986, p. 398), who pointed out that the
incumbent firms may earn positive profits even in a free entry equilibrium. In this paper, we
shall consider borh vcrsions of thc long run conditions, i.e., M ~ 0, M~ ~ 0 and M- M' - 0.
Wc start with the casc of a Cournot-Nash industry with entry. As in the short run case with
no entry, we first aim to derive an expn-ssion for thc labor demand. Differcntiate the long run
equilibrium conditions R' (n , m, w)- M and a'~(n , m, w)- M' and solve
(f~n ldw)~ -[(-J[w 7tm' t 1[w1IT)I(1[n 1tm - Rm7t~')]~ (47)
(am~aw )~ - ~(-Ttw'?t~ t 1tN.1t~')I(1t~ ltm - ltm lt~')~~ (48)
where subscripts are partials, c.g., ~t,;, -(1 - 9)aa~aw for the i-th fitm, holding n and m
constant, i.e., aw - da'~dw discussed in the no entry case. All these tenns can be further
simplified by differentiating the profit functions, but as in the previous sections, it is not
necessary to sign these terms to get the qualitative impact of rent-sharing on total economic
rents. For stability, we require that a~rz,~ - R,~R;,' ~ 0.11 (47) and (48) tell us how a change in
the home wagc will change the long run equilibrium number of firms in each country. Unlike
the short run case where n and m are 6xed, the per firtn output and per fvm labor demand now
also is a function of the equilibrium number of firms, i.e., x; - s; (n (w ), m(w ), w) and-13-
l; - J; (x; , w). To obtain expressions for (ax; lan )~ and (ax;lam ~, we differenáate the fum's
fvst order condiáons and impose symmetry:
1~i s t(n - I)lIx 1, j~.T, i m l~jiY.~~ }~j~ t 1I{,~dm - ()
n 1~y:s~ ~~ } I Rrl~ t(m - 1 hr)7~1 dy~ } Ry~dn f 1t~,,,~dm -()




Thus the slope of the long run home labor demand is




where the subscript f refers to the long run case, (dl; Idw )` is the slopc of the labor demand with
no entry as given by (39), (al, ~an )` and (a(, ~dm )` are given by (49) and (50) respecávely, and
(dn~dw)` and (dmldw)` are given by (47) and (48) respectively. The union's maximization
problem is similar to the no entry case, except now it will take the long run home labor demand
and long run pro6t sensitivity to the wage change into account rather than [heir short run
counterparts:
U -(x~ - k)nl; t 6n 1['
(U„, )j - nl; t (w - k )(d (nl; )~dw )f t 6(d(n ~f )Idw )j - 0
(U„M, )` ~ 0
Differenáaáng (UW )f with respect to w and 9,
(dwld 8)~ - -(d (n n' )l~ )il(U,.~,,.)i (52)- 16-
Using (52) we can compute (dNWld9)f:
(dNW !d 6)~ - ~1 - 8)[(d(n r[' Ydw )t`7Z1(Uww )i ? 0 (S3)
As before, we do not need to sign (d (n A' ydw )~ since it is square,d. Note that one
difference between (53) and its short run counterpart is that in the long run [d(n n' ydw J` ~
n(da'Idw )` , since n itself is endogenous. Note that (53) holds for borh long run conditions of
M -M'-OorM ~OandM~~O.
For the Bertrand case, the analysis is again analogous to the Cournot case. We shall again
leave the detailed derivations to the interested readers and simply state our result:
(d1VWIdd)B-(1 - A)[(d(n~ydw)Bj21(U,,,,,.)B Z0 (54)
Thus as in previous sections, for both the Cournot and Bertrand cases, national welfare will
not fall with management-labor cooperation. This holds true for both the zero pro5t and
constant positive profit long run conditions. For the case of tt' - 0, MV will be unaffected by
rcnt-sharing. This can be seen by inserting ~- 0 in (53) and (S4). Unlike the use of an
exogenous industriaJ policy such as a subsidy (Venablcs 1985, Horstman and Markusen 1986),
instituting rent-sharing will not lead to wasteful excessive entry. 71iis can bc verified by
examining the term (dn ~d9)`, where t is either c(Cournot) or B (Bertrand):
(dn ~d 9)` - (dnldw )`(dw Id8)~
With (dw id 9)~ --(d(n n' )~dw )~~(U,,,,,, )~ and n' - M,(SS) becomes
(dn ~d8)t - -M [(dn Idw )j]Z~(U,,,,,, )i ? 0
(SS)
(S6)
If h! - 0 we have dnld9 - 0, i.e., rent-sharing will not induce a change in the equilibrium
number of firms. As contrast to a government-imposed policy, rent-sharing wíll nor reduce
national welfare by promoting excessive entry even if we assume that in the long run,
equilibrium rents are completed dissipated.-17-
For the case of M ~ 0, we have generally M IdA ~ 0 and trom (53) and (54), dNWld 9 ~ 0.
The intuition here is that with long run positive equilibrium profits, an industry-wide rent-
sharing plan will provide thc union an incentive to change the equilibrium number of firms since
its share of profits is proportional to n. Thus dn Id8 ~ 0 with M ~ 0. To achieve a rise in n, the
union will change its optimizing wage to induce entry. Whether the wage should be raised or
lowered to increase n will depend on the sign of (dn Idw )`. In a standard two-stage game, the
union will take (dnldw)t into account when setting its optimal wage. As the equilibrium
number of firms rises, so will long run total home industry rents.12 For compactness, we
summarize our rcsults for the case of M~ 0:
Proposirion 3: For rhe multifirm inrernationa! o[igopoly wirh endogenous entry, rent-
sharing betwten the home union and the homt firms wif! increast tota! home tconomic rents
regardltssoj wherher tht internationa! firms art Cournot-Nash or Bertrand-Nash.
Finally, by comparing the expressions of dNW~d9 in all previous sections, we easily see
that they are all Cormally identical (compare (16), (30), (44), (46), (53), and (54)). We can in
fact write the generaljormula for the impact of management-labor cooperation on totaJ industry
rents as:
(dN1V ~d9)á - -(1 - 9)Id (n 1[' )Idw )z)Zi(U~,~, )á (57)
where t represcnts either Cournot or Bertnnd, ~ represcnts either long run or short run. If the
expression is evaluated for n- m- I, we get back the basic duopoly case. Thus the previous
sections tell us that unless d(n n' )idw - 0, rent sharing as a means to enhance labor-management
cooperation will generally raise total export rents no matter whether the international industry is
Cournot or Bertrand, no matter whether the industry has two firms or more than two firms, and
no matter whether the number of firms is fixed or endogenous. In other words, the effectiveness
of rent-sharing as a rent-enhancing industrial policy is robust with rtspect to the Eaton--18-
Grossman market swcture problem.
S. Domestic Consurttption
So far we have assumed that the home firms only export to a third market in order to focus
on the effects of a strategic industrial policy on economic rents. Here we shall relax this
restriction and consider the case where domestic consumption constitutes part of the home
wclfare. To make our point as simple as possible, we shall concenvate on the duopoly case. In
particular, we now consider the situation where the home firm produces x only for domestic
consumption and the foreign firm ezports y to the home country. We assume throughout this
section that thc uuopolists all have "not~nal" reaction functions, i.e., njy c 0, n~y c 0, x~- ~ 0
and nó.o ~ 0. Furthermore, we also invoke hcrc conditions that guarantec the uniqueness of the
respective Coumot and Bertrand equilibria, i.e., x~ t ~ n~, ~ c 0 and Ayy t ~~~ ~ c 0 for
quantiry-setting 5rms and nyP t ~ rt~o. ~ c 0 and ap-P.f ~tcó-o ~ c 0 tor price-setting firms
(Friedman 1977). Intuitively, these conditions rcquirc that the change to marginal profit due to
an increase of a firm's own strategic variable outweigh that due to an increase of the rival's
strategic variablc.
To obtain a measure of consumer's welfare, we assume that the home inverse demand
p(x, y) and p~(x, y) are generated by a representative consumer mazimizing a utiliry function
Z(x , y, m) - V(x , y) t m, wherc Z is linear and separable in m, the expenditure on a numeraire
good. V(x, y) is differentiable and stricUy concave. p (x , y) and p~(x , y) thus obtained are
twice-continuously differentiable and are downward sloping, i.e., pj ~ 0 and py ~ 0. For x and
y to be substitutes, we have py ~ 0 and p; ~ 0 and in particular if the demands are symmetric,
we have pj - py and py - p;. p(x , y) and p~(x , y) can be inverted to yield the direct demands
x(p , p~) and y(p, p~), which are twice-continuously differentiable with x t c 0, Y2 c 0, x2 ~ 0
and y~~ 0. If the demands are symmetric, we have x t- Y2 and zZ - y t. The use of Z implies-19-
that the margina) utility of income is one and legitimizes the partial equilibrium framework. The
measurs of consumer surplus CS is given by CS - V(x, y)- px - p~y . When evaluating
national welfarc, NW is now CS t a t U, i.e., home wclfare is the sum of home consumer
surplus, domestic profits and home labor's rents. For both the Coumot-Nash and Bcmand-Nash
cases, the sign of dNW ~d8 with positive domestic consumption is generally ambiguous. To
obtain some conditions for evaluating the impact of sharing rents, we proceed to differentiate CS
with respect to 6:
(dCS~d 8)` -(dw IdA)`[-xdpIdw - ydp'~dw ]` (58)
where T again refers to either c(Coumot) or B(Bertrand). For Cournot-Nash firms,
(dw~d 8)` ~ 0 by (14) and by the norma] reaction function assumption. If we have homogenous
goods with p- P~, (58) is reduced to (dCS ~d9)` -~dw ~dA)` (x t Y)(dP~dw )` .(dP ~dw )` -
p(d(x t y Vdw )` ~ 0 by (8), (9) and thc assumption of a unique cquilibrium (tcy~, t ~ tt~ I ~ 0).
Thcreforc, for homogcnous product, (dCS~dA)` ~ 0 and since from Proposition 1, we have
[d(n t U)~d9]` 2 0, we obtain the result that national welfare rises with rcnt-sharing in a
Cournot homogenous duopoly.
Alternatively, we can simply add the expression o( (dCS Id 6)` to (d (a t U)id 6)` and
obtain
(dNW Id9)` -(dw Id 9)` [(-xP: nyy - YPs nyy } YPy Ry: )(a!laz )~H t(w - k)d! Idw )` (59)
where (dw ~d6)` ~ 0 as before. Examining (59), since -xp, ayy ~ 0, -ypj rcyy ~ 0, and
~py rzyI ~ 0, the only term that can make (dNWid9)` ~ 0 is ypy nyx. So a sufficient condition for
(dNW ~d 6)` ~ 0 is for ypy ttyx to be overwhelmed by a term such as -xpj nyy. For symmetric
demands (p; - py ) and given the uniqueness assumption (ny~, t ~ nyI ~ ~ 0), -xp~ ay~, t)'Pynn ~
0 is reduced to x 2 y, i.e., the sufficient condition is that home output is required to be larger
than import volume. Furthermore, we can also look at an altemative sufficient condition, i.e., for-20-
ypy itys to be outweighed Dy -ypj ~,y. We can see that if the demand and cost functions ate
linear, -ypj Rn, t yprxys ~ 0 and (dNW Id6~ ~ 0. Thus we have cstablished some plausible
cases whcreby rent-sharing will be welfarc-enhancing with Cournot firms even with positive
domestic consumption: (i) if the goods are homogcnous, or (ii) if the demands are symmetric
and x 2 y or (iii) if the demand and cost functions are lineaz.
As for the Bertrand case, relatively little infotmation can be gained about the sign of
(dNWld9)B with domestic consumption. From (58), wc see that with pricc-setting firms
(dp Idw ~ ~ 0 and (dp'Idw ~ ~ 0 by (23), (24) and nP.P ~ 0. Howcver, thc difficulty arises with
the ambiguous sign of (dwld6)8 by (28) and (29). If the cost change effect dominaus the
collusive equilibrium etfect (sa the discussion associated with (29)), then (ditldw ~ ~ 0 and
(dwld A~ ~ 0. (58) then gives us (dCSIdA)B ~ 0, and with Proposition 1, (dNK'Id8)g ~ 0. If
demands are linear and the cost functions are linear, e.g., if x- a t- b tp t dp',
y- a Z - b?p' t dp and x- hl , where a; (i - 1, 2) ~ 0, b; (i - 1, 2) ~ 0, d ~ 0, and h~ 0, then
(d rtldw )B --x rh ~ 0 which means (d1VW Id A)B ~ 0. In general, if however (d ~tldw )B i 0, then
the consumer surplus is unambiguously reduced and no meaningful condition can be found for
national wclfare to rise with rcnt sharing.
To summariu, under a variety of conditions, rent-sharing may still raise national welfare
with domestic consumption. The sufficient conditions for the case of Coumot firms include (a)
homogeneous goods, or (b) symmetric demands with home output lazger than import volume,
and for Bertrand firms, the chief condition is for a rise in home wage to lower the home firm's
profits (i.e., d n~dw ~ 0). !n addirion ro the abovc conditions we can also state more concisely
the following:
Proposition 4. With positive domestic consumption, sharing rents raises home nariona!
weljare regardless of whether rhe duopolisrs are Cournor-Nash orBertrand-Nash iJthe demand-21-
andcnarfuncrlans me linaar.
Conclusion
In recent debates of industrial policies, it has often been suggested that one way to improve
international competitiveness is to reduce the advetsarial ttlationship between labor and
management. This paper examines rent-sharing as a mcans to achieve such cooperation. It is
shown that sharing rents in gcneral will increasc ovcrall rents, i.c., rent-sharing at home between
labor and the firm will increase total rents accrued to the home union and the home firm. As a
strategic industrial policy, the rent~nhancing effect of tnanagement-labor cooperation is robust
with respect to the market structure problem encountered in papers by Eaton and Grossman
(1986) and Cheng (1987). Rent-sharing will typically raise the sum of thc labor rents and the
firm's rents no matter whether the firms arc Cotunot-Nash or Bertrand-Nash, whether there are
two firms or morc than two fums, and whether the number of firms is fixed or endogenous.
Furthermorc, plausible conditions can a]so be found under which sharing rents can still raise
national welfaze if there is domestic consumption. For example, if the dernand and cost
functions are linear, then total national welfare with domestic consumption will rise with rent-
sharing.
Rent-sharing can be seen as creating a partial cartel between the labor union and the firm.
The creation of a cartel in any type of industry will generally raise the total monopoly rents. On
a practical level, the domestic producer can be thought of as providing any necessary
information about the product market structure to the domes[ic sharing union if the union dces
not already possess such knowledge. Thc union can then change its optimal wage to either
subsidize or to tax the firms to maximize total joint profits. Such discussions of joint strategies
and knowledge shazing can perhaps occur in a labor-management council. This type of joint
consultation scheme between management and labor is in fact quite widespread in lapan.-22-
Finally, we can note a gcncral implication of this paper for the implementation of sttategic
industrial policies: the governmcnt can ezogenously improve the competitiveness of the firms,
but that action will tend to be industry-specific since the government is ezogenous to the market
environment. A better way is to design incentive schemes such that the market participants can
endogenously and crcdibly cany out the "industrial" policies themselves. Since the
implementation of the policies is up to the private economic agenu who can adjust and adapt to
the specific market instances, results of the industrial policies will then tend to be robust.
Management-labor cooperation is an ezample of such an incentive scheme and it can be used as
a successful strategic industrial policy to raise rcnts under a variety of market strvctures.- 23 -
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Endnotes
l. For a study of the effects of rent-sharing on variables such as employment and price level
in an oligopolistic env'tronment, see Fung (1987a, 1987b).
2. Other works that stress the role of the factor mazket in the oontezt of strategic industrial
policy include Dixit and Grossman ( 1986) and Katz and Summers (1988).
3. For a discussion of the various union objectives, see Farber (1984).
4. Note that we have studied the effect of tent-sharing by employing the methodology of
comparative statics with respect to the ezogenous parameter 9. This in general is in
accordance with the notion in thc literaturt (e.g., Wcitzman 1987) that due to the insidcr-
outsider externalities (Lindbeck and Snower 1988), rent-sharing may not arise
endogenously.
5. There is still much disagreement of whether firms are on thcir labor demand curves. But
some justification of that can be given by twting that in general, unions may set or negotiate
the wage, but employment is typically left to be decided by the firms. Also, there is some
recent empirical evidence which shows that firms are on their labor demands (Oswald
1984). However, as pointed out independently by Professor Gene Grossman, Professor
Lawrence Summers and Professor Masahiko Aoki, our results could be significantly altered
if the firms are off their labor demand curves due to efficient bargains.
6. I am indebted to Professor Gene Grossman and Professor Dani Rodrik for raising the issue
of how the union can in practice obtain the necessary information about the product market.
7. There am some disagreements as to whcther the government should be modeled as a first
mover, see Rodrik and Zeckhauser (1987).
8. The method of analysis here is similar to the multifit~n case in Faton and Grossman ( 1986).-n-
9. The method of derivations is the same a the Cournot case: first, the labor demand is
detived, then from the union's first order condition, we obtain dw 1d 9, using dw ~dA, we
have dNW Id 9 for the Bertrand case.
]0. As pointed out by Professor Gene Grossman, if we have a separatc union for each firm, our
results can be changed. However, at leasi for the case of the U.S., the industrial union
assumption seems appropriate.
1 l. A similar stability condition is discussed in Brander and Kntgman (1983).
12. Note that qualitatively similar results can be found in Dixit and Kyle (1985) and Venables
(1985), who showed that policies that proroote domestic cntry will raise national welfare.Discussion Paper Series, CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands:
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